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ABSTRACT
Research suggests that voters use identity markers to infer
information about candidates for office. Yet politicians have
various markers that often point in conflicting directions, and it is
unclear how citizens respond to competing signals – especially
outside of a few highly stigmatized groups in the US. Given the
relevance of these issues for electoral behavior and patterns of
representation, this article examines the impact of intersectional
identities and less intensely stigmatized markers in Canada, the
UK, and the US. It does so using a survey experiment that varies
the race (white/East Asian) and class background (higher/lower) of
a candidate for office. I then compare results across the cases,
examining willingness to vote for the candidate as well as
assumptions about his ideological proximity, relatability, and
potential contributions. In doing so, I build from past research
suggesting that voter ideology likely shapes reactions to
candidates from disadvantaged backgrounds. Results suggest that
marginalized identity markers have relatively widespread effects
among leftists and (to a lesser extent) centrists, but that, outside
of the Canadian left, class seems to matter more than race.
Overlapping marginalized identities, in turn, had little impact, with
the lower-class white and East-Asian profiles eliciting similar
reactions.
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Voters use a variety of shortcuts to infer information about candidates for office (e.g.
Popkin 1994; Bartels 1996). One such set of heuristics is centered around identity
markers, such as race and class, that appear to be relevant considerations for many citizens
(e.g. Citrin, Green, and Sears 1990; Carnes and Lupu 2016). By shaping presumed policy
stances, perceptions of relatability, and/or assumptions about potential contributions, can-
didate markers may thus have important knock-on effects: trait-based influences on vote
choice are liable to impact both the descriptive representation of marginalized groups and
the prominence of their concerns in the political arena (e.g. Cowley 2013; Carnes and
Sadin 2014; Jacobson and Carson 2015; O’Grady 2019). Yet candidates are not defined
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by a single marker and, most of the time, not every facet of a candidate’s identity will send
the same set of signals. So how do citizens react in the face of conflicting markers?
When presented, for example, with equivalent working class white and upper-middle
class racialized candidates, voters may well give pride of place to class or race. Similarly,
they may or may not give special weight to intersecting marginalized identities (Crenshaw
1989) – perhaps viewing a racialized working-class candidate as more progressive or rela-
table than either a lower-class white candidate or a higher-class racialized one. Most exist-
ing research, however, does not allow us to assess the interactive influence of competing
and complementary identity markers. What is more, even our understanding of the effects
of individual markers is limited to a narrow subset of cases: past studies have concentrated
on perceptions of African-American and female candidates, and have been disproportio-
nately focused on the US (e.g. Jacobsmeier 2015; Lerman and Sadin 2016).
Each of these limitations is problematic. First, the effects of candidate identity markers
may well be multiplicative rather than additive. As Philpot and Walton (2007, 49) argued
in one of the few studies to consider the potential importance of intersectionality, “voters
do not necessarily use one identity at the expense of the other when making political
decisions. Rather, multiple identities can interact to create a separate single identity that
can be used to evaluate candidates.” Second, while there are good reasons to be interested
in how citizens react to candidates from particularly stigmatized groups, this focus leaves
us with only a partial picture of identity-based effects: we know surprisingly little about
reactions to less negatively stereotyped racialized groups, such as East Asians (see Visal-
vanich 2017a); and scholars have only recently begun to study the potential impact of can-
didates’ class backgrounds (e.g. Carnes and Sadin 2014; Carnes and Lupu 2016). Third,
there are good reasons to think that past findings in the American context may not
reflect dynamics elsewhere. To the extent that voters use class and race as cues, the
effects of identity markers (and their interactions) are likely shaped by the salience and
meaning of those markers within the broader political context (e.g. Coffé and Theiss-
Morse 2016; Konitzer et al. 2019).
Given the relevance of these issues for electoral behavior and patterns of representation,
this article uses a survey experiment fielded in Canada, the UK, and the US to study (1) the
impact of intersectional identities, (2) the relevance of markers from less intensely stigma-
tized social groups, and (3) the uniformity of these effects cross-nationally. Although there
are countless parameters of disadvantage that one could explore (e.g. gender, sexuality,
disability, etc.), this first cut at the issue focuses on the intersection of candidate class
and racial markers. The choice of countries allows us to compare results from the
(highly-studied) American context to those in two cases where class and race are likely
to have divergent levels of salience: on the one hand, social class has tended to play a
much more prominent political role in the UK (e.g. Lipset 1983; Bélanger and Eagles
2006; Evans and Tilley 2012); on the other, Canada’s long history of multiculturalism
has helped to generate a particularly acute focus on ethnic inclusion and diversity, includ-
ing on the political right (Winter 2007; Harell 2009; Bird, Saalfeld, and Wüst 2010).
The experiment employs a two-by-two, between-subjects factorial design, varying the
race (white/East Asian) and class background markers (higher/lower) of a candidate for
office. I then investigate treatment effects across the three countries, examining respon-
dents’ willingness to vote for the candidate as well as assumptions about the candidate’s
ideological proximity, relatability, and potential contributions. In doing so, I also build
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from past research suggesting that respondent ideology likely shapes reactions to candi-
dates from disadvantaged backgrounds (e.g. Weaver 2012; Campbell and Cowley
2014a) and consider potential divergences between leftist, centrist, and rightist
respondents.
The results of the study suggest considerable cross-national variation, but several pat-
terns nevertheless emerge. First, the impact of the marginalized identity markers is almost
always positive in nature, but these effects are largely concentrated among centrist and
(especially) leftist respondents. Second, in the face of candidate identity markers that
send conflicting signals, class background mattered more than race everywhere but on
the Canadian left. Finally, overlapping marginalized identities do not appear to have
shaped reactions, as the lower-class white and East-Asian treatments had broadly
similar effects.
Heuristics, biases, and candidate assessment
While the keenest of citizens may collect information on candidates via campaign
material, newspaper articles, and debates, most voters also employ shortcuts that help
to compensate for limited time and knowledge (e.g. Popkin 1994; Bartels 1996). These
heuristics include not only straightforward political markers such as party labels (e.g.
Tomz and Van Houweling 2009; Tessier and Blanchet 2017), but also candidate identity
markers that are assumed to provide relevant information. Indeed, this is an incredibly
widespread phenomenon, ranging from gender (e.g. Anderson, Lewis, and Baird 2011)
to sexuality (e.g. Doan and Haider-Markel 2010) to religious background (e.g. Campbell
and Cowley 2014b). Here I focus on two relatively less stigmatized markers – East-
Asian and/or working-class backgrounds – that have only recently started to garner scho-
larly attention. A brief overview of the literatures on race and social class allows us to tease
out how these markers might matter both independently and interactively.
Research indicating that race shapes voter assessments of candidates dates back decades
(e.g. Brady and Sniderman 1985; Citrin, Green, and Sears 1990) – yet it is also surprisingly
narrow, as the bulk of its focus has been on the perception of black candidates in the US. In
broad strokes, this work suggests that African-American candidates are perceived to be
more liberal, compassionate, and committed to minority rights issues than white candi-
dates (e.g. Jacobsmeier 2015; Lerman and Sadin 2016), but that they may also be the
victims of anti-black prejudices at the ballot box (c.f. Hutchings 2009; Schaffner 2011).
Yet it is an open question whether these dynamics extend to politicians from other
racial groups: while research on Latino candidates typically suggests similar effects to
those found with African Americans, Asian-American candidates may be an exception
to this pattern (c.f. Visalvanich 2017b; Kirkland and Coppock 2018). Nevertheless, analysis
of electoral behavior in other Western democracies (including Britain) suggests that min-
ority candidates typically suffer from vote penalties, especially from citizens on the politi-
cal right (Fisher et al. 2015; Portmann and Stojanović 2019).
Our understanding of the impact of candidate class background is relatively less devel-
oped. Although studies have long highlighted that class stereotypes are ubiquitous (e.g.
Cozzarelli, Wilkinson, and Tagler 2001; Lott and Saxon 2002), most existing research
has only tangentially addressed the impact of class background on candidate assessments.
Research on the effect of occupational background, for example, has looked at differences
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within the (upper) middle-class, but has not incorporated working-class occupations (e.g.
Campbell and Cowley 2014b; Coffé and Theiss-Morse 2016). Yet several recent studies
buck this trend. Carnes and Sadin (2014) find that American voters assume that politicians
with working-class backgrounds are more economically progressive than other candidates,
even when party labels are specified. In a study of the UK, the US, and Argentina, Carnes
and Lupu (2016) conclude: (1) that respondents from all countries view working-class
candidates as more relatable and equally qualified, and that they are just as likely to
vote for them; and (2) that Britons (though not Americans or Argentinians) see
working-class candidates as more left-wing. And though their focus is not expressly on
class per se, Campbell and Cowley (2014a) report, in a study examining how citizens
respond to relative candidate wealth, that richer candidates are particularly disliked by
centrist and left-wing respondents in the UK.
Previous research is most lacking, however, when it comes to assessing the effect of
overlapping class and racial identities. Notwithstanding the prevalence of psychological
research highlighting that identity markers interact to shape stereotype formation (e.g.
Landrine 1985; Lott and Saxon 2002), the closest studies to this one are focused on the
intersection of candidate gender with other markers (e.g. Carey and Lizotte 2019). Yet,
the varied conclusions of past research suggest that the effect of interacting candidate
markers will differ depending on the characteristics under consideration.
On the one hand, there are those scholars who stress the importance of intersectionality
(e.g. Crenshaw 1989; Doan and Haider-Markel 2010; Badas and Stauffer 2017). Most rele-
vantly, Philpot and Walton (2007) argue that in the US, candidate race and gender cannot
be considered independently: finding that black female candidates are treated differently
than both black men and white women, they conclude that “race trumps gender but
the intersection of the two trumps both” (Philpot andWalton 2007, 49). Yet other scholars
suggest that certain identities may crowd out others. Coffé and Theiss-Morse’s (2016)
study of candidate gender and occupational profiles, for example, suggests that candidate
occupation, not gender, shapes competency perceptions in the US and New Zealand. For
them, the key consideration is the ease with which a given set of stereotypes can be applied
to politics: since gender-based assumptions are comparatively broad, they are more easily
overridden by assumptions about occupational profiles (Coffé and Theiss-Morse 2016; see
also Irmen 2006; Anderson, Lewis, and Baird 2011). But although this logic is easy to apply
when one of the two markers is work experience, it is not obvious how one can make a
similar a priori assessment in cases where both markers are identity-based.
Finally, note that there are strong reasons to believe that all of these effects should vary
according to respondent ideology. Previous research suggests that voters may assume that
racialized minorities (e.g. Brady and Sniderman 1985; Jacobsmeier 2015) and working-
class candidates (c.f. Carnes and Sadin 2014; Carnes and Lupu 2016) are more progressive,
all else being equal. Based on this heuristic, we would expect leftists to be more likely to
support such candidates, whereas conservatives may shy away from them (e.g. Fisher
et al. 2015; Lerman and Sadin 2016). Similarly, right-wing voters may be more biased
than others against racialized and lower-class politicians, while those on the left might
even “positively discriminate” in favor of less advantaged candidates (e.g. Weaver 2012;
Campbell and Cowley 2014a; Portmann and Stojanović 2019). Regardless of the precise
balance of heuristics and prejudice, however, existing scholarship suggests that ideology
is likely to structure voter responses to class- and race-based markers.
4 A. KEVINS
Taken as a whole, the above research leads us to assume that voters’ attitudes toward
candidates for office are likely influenced by the candidate’s race and class background.
Three issues remain unclear, however: the impact of intersectional identities; the relevance
of identity markers from less intensely stigmatized social groups; and the generalizability
of findings from the US. The remainder of this article provides one attempt to address
these limitations.
Data and case selection
Respondents were recruited via Qualtrics LLC’s Internet panel, with national samples con-
structed to reflect census demographics on the gender and age distribution of their
respective adult populations. The surveys in Canada and the UK were conducted in
December 2017, while the US variant was fielded in July 2018. After removing individuals
who responded “Don’t know” to any of the questions used in the analysis,1 we are left with
a total of 1103 Canadians (outside of Quebec),2 1129 Britons, and 1740 Americans.3
The three cases all have sizeable and relatively long-standing immigrant and visible
minority populations, and their shared use of English allows me to avoid introducing
any translation-related variation. Elected representatives in all three countries are also dis-
proportionately likely to be white and of a higher class background (Bloemraad 2013;
Lamprinakou et al. 2016; O’Grady 2019) – though a lack of comparative work on the
latter dimension makes it difficult to pin down exact patterns of class representation.
Most importantly, however, this case selection allows us to compare results from the
highly-studied American context to those in two cases where class and race are likely to
have divergent levels of salience.
Addressing these expectations in turn, I begin by noting that class is likely to have a
greater impact on attitudes towards candidates in the UK than in Canada and the US.
Social class has tended to play a comparatively prominent societal role in Britain,
with class dynamics both shaped by and shaping British politics (e.g. Evans 1999;
Evans and Tilley 2012). Indeed, the decreasing presence of working-class candidates
in Britain has been highlighted as a source of reduced working-class policy preference
representation and increased alienation among working-class voters (e.g. Evans and
Tilley 2017; O’Grady 2019). Class consciousness and class politics in North America,
by contrast, have been relatively muted, with class voting comparatively uncommon
and regional and religious cleavages far more dominant (e.g. Lipset 1983; Bélanger
and Eagles 2006).
At the same time, Canada’s long history of multiculturalism has given ethnic diversity a
particularly central role in (at least Anglophone) Canadian identity (e.g. Winter 2007;
Harell 2009). Comparing Canada to the UK and the US, this distinction seems to manifest
in a variety of relevant ways: more extensive efforts on the political right to attract visible
minority candidates, potentially shifting ideological assumptions tied to racial markers
(Bird, Saalfeld, and Wüst 2010); a somewhat smaller overall gap in racial descriptive rep-
resentation (Bloemraad 2013); and a unique disconnect between on the one hand, white
voters and the right, and on the other, visible-minority voters and the left (Medeiros and
Noël 2014, 1036–1037). And while Canada is by no means “post-racial,” xenophobia levels
and biases against (non-Aboriginal) visible minorities appear to nevertheless be weaker,
on average, that in the UK or the US (Ariely 2012; Harell, Soroka, and Iyengar 2016).
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As a consequence, we would expect Canadian voters’ reactions to visible-minority candi-
dates to stand out from those of their British and American counterparts.
Past research, then, leads us to expect that Canada and the US will share low levels of
class salience (relative to the UK) while the UK and the US will share higher levels of racial
salience (relative to Canada). Yet given the lack of comparative studies on the attitudinal
effects of candidate identity markers and the perils of drawing out country-level determi-
nants with only three cases, we proceed to the analysis in a broadly exploratory manner.
Experimental design
The survey experiment uses a two by two, between-subjects factorial design – with varying
racial (white/East Asian) and class (higher/lower) backgrounds. In doing so, it follows past
work (Lerman and Sadin 2016; Carnes and Lupu 2016) in presenting respondents with a
single candidate profile. Rather than studying how respondents actively compare white/
East-Asian candidates from lower/higher-class backgrounds, the goal is thus to examine
the simple difference generated by varying candidate identity markers.
At the start of the experimental vignette, respondents were informed that they would be
presented with “a few questions about a man who is thinking of running as a candidate for
the [House of Commons/Congress]” and were asked to “Please carefully read his short
biography below and answer the questions that follow.” They were then presented with
the following text (T1 denotes the race-based treatment, while T2 denotes the class-
based one):
John [T1: Kavanagh/Kim] is 40 years old and was born and raised in [Canada/the US/the
UK], though his parents immigrated to the country from [T1: Ireland/South Korea].
John’s father was [Canada & US [T2: a factory worker/an orthopedic surgeon] / UK [T2:
a factory worker/an orthopaedic surgeon]], and his parents sent him to [Canada & US
[T2: public/private] / UK [T2: state/private]] schools as a child and teen. John is proud of
his [T1: Irish/Korean] roots, but he considers himself [Canadian/American/British] to the
core, and he wants to make a real contribution to his country through public service. A
self-defined “complete centrist,” John’s political stances have been widely described as
squarely in the middle of the ideological spectrum, both on social and economic issues.
A few considerations are worth noting at this point. First, the text focuses on the candi-
date’s class background, highlighting his family situation while he was growing up. This
is in keeping with common practices among candidates campaigning for office (Carnes
and Sadin 2014), and also allows me to avoid introducing variation relative to related
yet distinct factors, such as post-secondary education, occupation, or wealth (Campbell
and Cowley 2014a; Coffé and Theiss-Morse 2016). As described below, however, I also
follow up with respondents to confirm an effect on the candidate’s perceived class
status. Second, I wanted to ensure that the race-based treatments did not also induce
different connotations regarding immigrant status. I therefore defined both the white
and non-white candidates as the children of immigrants, while also highlighting the can-
didates’ identification with Canada/Britain/America.
Third, I sought to avoid selecting white and non-white ethnic backgrounds that were
associated were overly divergent levels of stigmatization. For this reason, I followed
recent research (Visalvanich 2017a) and opted to give the non-white candidate an East-
Asian background – a so-called “model minority” group (Maddux et al. 2008); this
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status as an “acceptable” minority group is broadly common across the cases, with past
work suggesting that whites are generally less racist toward East Asians than toward
other visible minority groups (e.g. Blacks, South Asians) in all three of the countries
under study (Harell, Soroka, and Iyengar 2016). The specific choice of Korean and Irish
was, in turn, guided by two goals: to reduce the possibility that respondents would call
to mind a prominent real-world candidate when presented with the vignette; and to
increase the likelihood that respondents would infer white and East-Asian racial back-
grounds. And while the Irish were of course historically discriminated against in all
three of these countries (e.g. See 2000), it is clear that they are now deemed “white” by
their broader host populations. Whether Irish immigrants to the UK are presently con-
sidered more similar to the native population (given the closer relationship between the
nations) than in Canada and the US, however, is a question that existing research does
not allow us to address.
Finally, the candidate is described (and self-defines) as a centrist, but I refrain from
giving him a party label. This reduces respondent reliance on partisan heuristics (see,
e.g. Campbell and Cowley 2018; Kirkland and Coppock 2018), while at the same time
holding constant a common ideological baseline. The result is better isolation of candi-
date-trait effects and increased experimental power, as we avoid a multiplication of treat-
ment groups (a particular issue outside of the bipartisan American context). The trade-off,
however, is a certain loss of realism: despite the presence of non-partisan elections and
“independent” elected officials at lower levels of government, party labels are of course
central to national elections in all three countries under study; and these labels have
been shown to matter for political behavior across these cases – reducing, for example,
the extent to which voters project their own attitudes onto candidates (e.g. Banducci
et al. 2008; Tomz and Van Houweling 2009; Tessier and Blanchet 2017). The specific
choice of a centrist baseline, in turn, allows for a symmetrical comparison of left- and
right-wing responses. This decision has the consequence, however, of creating an asymme-
try between centrist respondents – who were presented with a candidate who reflects their
ideological position – and left- and right-wing respondents – who were not. It also gen-
erates a harder test of ideological heuristics than if I had provided no information whatso-
ever about the candidate’s ideological position.
After being presented with the treatment, respondents were asked a series of questions
about the candidate. The wording of these questions was as follows:
Without knowing which party John will be a candidate for, to what extent do you agree or
disagree that…
• [Vote:] You would consider voting for John.
• [Similar:] John’s political stances are likely similar to your own.
• [Understand:] Someone like John can understand the problems facing ordinary [Cana-
dians/Americans/Britons].
• [More:] We need more people like John in [Parliament/Congress].
These questions were intended to capture the influence of candidate race and class back-
ground on: (1) willingness to vote for the candidate (vote); (2) assumptions about the can-
didate’s ideological proximity (similar); (3) the candidate’s perceived relatability
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(understand); and (4) the potential contribution of a candidate to parliament, whether
driven by representative concerns of a substantive or descriptive nature (more).4 Note
that while the vote question is meant to serve as a summary assessment, it is a rather
blunt instrument for doing so – especially given the lack of competing candidates in
the experimental prompt. The remaining three survey items are thus useful for exploring
specific dimensions of candidate assessments. Potential responses to all questions were on
a five-point scale of “strongly disagree,” “somewhat disagree,” “neither agree nor disagree,”
“somewhat agree” and “strongly agree.” Answers were then rescaled from between 0 to 1
for the analysis. Online Appendix Table 1 provides the mean and standard deviation of
responses to these questions in Canada, the UK, and the US.
On the screen following these questions, respondents were asked about the class back-
ground of the candidate they had just read about, thereby allowing us to assess the pres-
ence of a class treatment effect: in Canada and the UK respondents were asked “Would
you describe John as…Working class; Middle class; Upper-middle class: Upper class;
Don’t know”; while in the US, the equivalent question was divided across two survey
items, allowing respondents to separately define the candidate as working class (“Yes;
No; Don’t know”) and to place him on a more refined vertical class hierarchy (“Lower
class; Lower-middle class; Middle class; Upper-middle class; Upper class; Don’t know”).5
Self-placement on the ideological spectrum, by contrast, was recorded considerably prior
to the experiment, so as to avoid excessive priming effects. Specifically, respondents were
asked to position themselves on a left-right political scale ranging from 0 (“Most left”) to
10 (“Most right”), with an additional option for “Don’t know.” I use answers to this question
to divide respondents into leftists (0–3), centrists (4–6), and rightists (7–10).6
Findings
The main analysis is based on a series of OLS regressions7 carried out in two steps: first, I
assess broad similarities and differences across the full samples using three-way inter-
actions between candidate race, candidate class, and country; and second, I use a four-
way interaction (adding in political stance) to examine the effects of respondent ideology.
In each case, I run the same model on responses to vote, similar, more, and understand
while using a consistent underlying sample (i.e. excluding respondents with missing
data on any other item in the analysis). Taken together, these four questions help us to
determine how candidates’ racial and class backgrounds shape citizens’ reactions to them.
As assessing direct and interactive effects via regression tables is complex, findings are
illustrated via figures8 showing the marginal effect of each treatment relative to the higher-
class white candidate. This approach makes it easy for us to tease out the impact of the two
markers of comparative disadvantage, and it also has the merit of reflecting the real-world
prevalence of higher-class (and male) white representatives (see, for example, Bloemraad
2013; Lamprinakou et al. 2016). The figures include both 95% (the thin line) and 90%
confidence intervals (the thick line), thereby allowing us to note the treatment groups
where average responses to a given question were significantly different from those in
the higher-class white baseline group. In each instance, effects in Canada are illustrated
with a red square, those in the UK with a yellow diamond, and those in the US with a
blue circle. Finally, recall that the total response range for each of the dependent variables
is 1.
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Presenting the first stage of the analysis, Figure 1 shows the full sample treatment effects
for each of the four questions (see Appendix Table A1 for regression results).9 Beginning
with responses to vote, we note clear cross-country differences. Relative to the higher-class
white baseline: Canadians were more likely to state they would consider voting for the can-
didate only when he had the lower-class Asian profile; Britons were more likely to do so
only with the lower-class white profile (though this difference narrowly misses conven-
tional significance levels, at p = 0.052); and Americans were more likely to agree whenever
the candidate had a lower-class background, regardless of race. Strikingly, responses to
similar are affected by candidate identity markers in precisely the same manner. Treat-
ment effects for understand, by contrast, are stable across the three countries and
Figure 1. Treatment effects (relative to higher-class white profile baseline), by country.
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suggest an impact of class, but not race: the two lower-class candidate profiles receive a
similar relatability bonus relative to either of the two higher-class candidate profiles.
Finally, we find comparable, though more muted, effects on more in Canada and the
US – with lower-class background again the key determinant – but no evidence that can-
didate identity markers mattered in the UK.
These overall effects should vary considerably across the political spectrum, however,
and the remainder of our analysis thus includes an additional interaction with respondent
ideology (see Appendix Table A2 for regression results). Figure 2 presents our first insight
Figure 2. Treatment effects (relative to higher-class white profile baseline) among left-wing respon-
dents, by country.
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into this potential variation by illustrating treatment effects among leftist respondents,
once again relative to the higher-class white treatment baseline.10 Results are broadly
similar to those found in Figure 1, though with some important exceptions. On vote,
we find no evidence of effects in the US: it is only in Canada and the UK that the candidate
profiles clearly shaped agreement on this question. Among Canadian leftists, we note a
higher likelihood of voting for the East-Asian candidate regardless of his class background,
alongside a near-significant effect for the lower-class white candidate; effect sizes are rela-
tively sizeable as well, suggesting a shift in responses ranging from a third to a half of a
standard deviation.11 Among British leftists, in turn, we find a positive effect only in
the case of the lower-class white treatment.12
We find greater evidence of cross-country overlap, however, when it comes to left-wing
respondents’ assumptions about shared political stances: a lower class background led to
more positive responses to similar in all three countries (at significant or near-significant
levels), with the sole exception of the lower-class white profile in Canada. Effects sizes here
are comparable across the cases, though their magnitudes are more modest than those
found on vote.13 A comparable pattern, with cross-case alignment alongside Canadian
exceptionalism, is also present for understand. Leftists in all three countries were more
likely to say that the candidate could understand the sorts of problems facing ordinary citi-
zens when he had a lower-class background, regardless of class; yet Canadian leftists were
also more likely to agree when the candidate was higher-class and Asian. What is more, the
magnitude of these effect sizes is substantial, ranging from 53% of a standard deviation
(US, lower-class white treatment) to 86% of one (Canada, lower-class Asian treatment).
Finally, treatment effects on leftist responses to more are less widespread, particularly in
the UK and the US. In Canada, results mirror those for vote: respondents are more
likely to agree with this statement only when the candidate was Asian, regardless of his
class background. On the British and American left, by contrast results indicate that
solely in the case of the lower-class Asian candidate is there any difference from the base-
line, higher-class white treatment. The magnitude of these effects is nevertheless relatively
large, with variation ranging from 32% of a standard deviation (US, lower-class Asian
treatment) to 57% of one (UK, lower-class Asian treatment).
Figure 3 repeats the exercise, but for centrist respondents – a group that, it should be
recalled, was presented with a candidate ostensibly aligned with their ideological pos-
ition.14 Unsurprisingly, the result is a reduced set of significant treatment effects with
weaker impacts, save for in the US. Indeed, for both vote and similar, the only treatment
effects that even near significance are found among Americans: for vote, we note modestly
more positive reactions to the lower-class Asian profile15 as well as a smaller effect (strad-
dling the 90% confidence level, with p = 0.10), for the lower-class white treatment; while
for similar, all three of our alternative candidate profiles increased assumed ideological
proximity. In this latter case, however, the marginal effect size of the higher-class Asian
treatment on perceived ideological proximity is markedly smaller than for either the
lower-class white (with a t-statistic of 2.64 and a two-tailed p-value of 0.01) or Asian
profile (t =−2.56, p = 0.01).
Treatment effects for understand are more comparable to those found among leftists,
but several differences nevertheless stand out. On the one hand, their magnitude is some-
what more modest: whereas on the left these significant treatments were associated with
agreement increases between 53% and 86% of a standard deviation, here the
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corresponding spread is between 27% (UK, lower-class white treatment) and 54%
(Canada, lower-class Asian treatment). On the other hand, we also find that several of
the Asian treatment effects that were significant among leftists drop out – namely, the
higher-class variant in Canada, and the lower-class one in the UK. Indeed, these two
race-based effects lose significance in the exact same cases for more as well. Overall,
effects on more are found exclusively with the two North American samples and entirely
reflect class distinctions.
Finally, Figure 4 rounds out our analysis by presenting treatment effects among right-
wing respondents.16 To begin, we note no impact of any of the candidate profile variations
Figure 3. Treatment effects (relative to higher-class white profile baseline) among centrist respon-
dents, by country.
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on agreement with vote. Treatment effects on similar are comparably sparse, though we do
see two near-significant effects for the Asian candidate treatments: with decreased assumed
similarity in the US when the Asian candidate had a higher class background17 and
increased assumed similarity in Canada when he had a lower-class one.18 Treatment
effects on understand, by contrast, are larger and more generalized, with greater agreement
among Canadians presented with either of the lower-class background candidates, among
Britons presented with any of the three alternative candidate profiles, and among Amer-
icans presented with the lower-class Asian one.19 Note that we thus find positive, race-
based treatment effects among right-wing Britons that were absent for their centrist
Figure 4. Treatment effects (relative to higher-class white profile baseline) among right-wing respon-
dents, by country.
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counterparts – though a greater similarity to higher-class candidates is of course to be
expected from this group. By contrast, we find no evidence in any of the countries to
suggest that identity markers affected right-wing responses to more.
Bringing these findings together points to several conclusions. First, when lower-class
and non-white identity markers mattered, it was by and large for respondents on the left
and, to a lesser extent, the center; it is only with candidate relatability (understand) that we
see clear indications of an effect among rightists. Yet even on the right, whenever the
lower-class and/or East-Asian markers had a statistically significant effect (relative to
the higher-class white baseline), it was a positive one. Notwithstanding a near-significant
negative effect among American rightists’ perceptions of ideological proximity (similar),
we thus find little evidence to suggest more negative reactions to marginalized identity
markers on the right; instead, ideological differences are tied to the rarer presence of (posi-
tive) treatment effects among conservatives.
Second, in this comparatively hard test of racial effects, class background by and large
appears to have mattered more than race. This finding is easiest to see if we consider reac-
tions to the higher-class Asian treatment. On the left and center – the two groups that past
research suggests would be more likely to react positively to racialized candidates – this
profile was generally associated with either no treatment effect (relative to the higher-
class white baseline) or a weaker effect than either of the lower-class background treat-
ments; the major exception to this rule, however, is on the Canadian left, where this
profile solicited more positive reactions on three of the four questions (vote, understand,
and more). On the right, by contrast, the only effects present suggest greater perceived
relatability in Britain (understand) but lower perceived ideological proximity in the US
(similar).
Third, the intersection of marginalized identities seems to have had little impact. Reac-
tions to the lower-class Asian and white candidates typically mirrored one another, and
where they did not, the direction of the difference was just as likely to favor the white can-
didate as the Asian one. On the one hand, there are a few instances where the lower-class
Asian treatment had a (positive) effect while the equivalent white profile did not – namely,
on the Canadian left and right with similar, and on the left cross-nationally withmore; yet,
only with British leftist responses to more was this difference large enough to be statisti-
cally distinguishable (with a t-statistic of −2.15 and a two-tailed p-value of 0.03). On the
other hand, the lower-class background Asian candidate was given modestly worse scores
than his white counterpart on similar (t = 1.83, p = 0.07) and understand (t = 1.73, p =
0.08) by British centrists.
Finally, we also saw evidence of substantial cross-country variation. Arguably the most
marked difference in this regard has already been mentioned, as the higher-class Asian
profile increased agreement with vote, understand, and more among Canadian leftists
but had no effect on the British or American left; given the weaker connection between
visible minorities and the left in Canada, both in terms of voting behavior and candidate
race, this is a particularly striking result. Among centrists, treatment effects were especially
widespread among Americans (with eight significant effects), more modest in Canada
(with two significant and two near-significant effects), and particularly muted in the
UK (with only one near-significant effect). Cross-country differences were much less
visible on the right, however – largely because the treatments simply had little impact
on rightist responses to the questions.
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I confirm the robustness of these conclusions in several ways: varying the sample size
across the regressions (by including respondents who answered “Don’t know” to questions
not required for a given model) has minimal impact on the results; and the same is true of
using an alternative breakdown for ideological affiliation (namely, leftists (0–4), centrists
(5), and rightists (6–10)) or limiting the sample to white respondents. Most importantly, I
also ensure that respondents noticed a class difference between the upper- and lower-class
background treatments, irrespective of the candidate’s race. Examining the marginal
effects20 of the lower-class treatment on the candidate’s perceived class (see Online Appen-
dix Figure 5 for an illustration of the effects and Appendix Table A2 for the underlying
regression results) suggests that the class treatment shifted assigned class in the expected
direction. There is, however, one point of distinction between the North American and
British samples. In both Canada and the US, the lower-class treatment decreased the prob-
ability that a respondent would declare the candidate upper-middle or upper class while
increasing the likelihood of any other label. In the UK, by contrast, that class treatment
effect was concentrated in a move toward labeling the candidate working class: the like-
lihood of saying he was middle class remained unchanged for the white candidate and
even decreased slightly for the Asian one. Despite this difference, the race treatment
was in no case itself associated with a shift in class assignment (see Online Appendix
Figure 6, based on the same set of regression results).
Conclusion
This study set out to explore the relative impact of race, class, and their intersection on
voter assessments of candidates for office. It did so using a survey experiment in which
Canadian, British, and American respondents were asked a series of questions about a
fictional candidate, with varying (white/East Asian) race and class (higher/lower)
markers included in the biographical profile. I then compared results across the three
cases, examining willingness to vote for the candidate as well as assumptions about his
ideological proximity, relatability, and potential contributions. In doing so, I also built
from past research suggesting that ideology likely shapes reactions to candidates from dis-
advantaged backgrounds and considered possible divergences between leftist, centrist, and
rightist respondents.
Notwithstanding the meaningful cross-national variation that was uncovered, the
findings of the study suggest several general conclusions tied to the broader literatures
on heuristics, voting behavior, and patterns of representation. First, the effects of the
two marginalized identity markers were relatively common among centrist and
(especially) leftist respondents, and almost always induced more positive reactions, even
among conservatives. Second, we noted widespread class effects, regardless of whether
we look at Britons or (more surprisingly) Americans and Canadians. Third, race effects
are notably more muted than one might assume based on American studies looking at
more stigmatized racial groups – the only exception being on the Canadian left. Finally,
overlapping marginalized identities evidently had little impact, with the lower-class
white and East-Asian profiles eliciting broadly similar reactions.
Overall, the findings highlight the value of examining candidate identity markers in
tandem, focusing on the ways in which their potentially conflicting effects might vary ideo-
logically and cross-nationally. In doing so, this study has attempted to compensate for
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limited work on non-American and non-black racialized candidates, a relative dearth of
research on the impact of class background, and a general tendency to neglect the effect
of intersecting identity markers. The two-by-two, between-subjects factorial setup
allowed us to tease out the relative impact of racial and class backgrounds, and I attempted
to minimize the likelihood that the results might simply reflect large divergences in societal
stigmatization, rather than race per se, via a focus on a so-called “model minority” group
(Maddux et al. 2008). As a result of this approach, however, the findings here necessarily
represent a more conservative test of biases against racialized candidates.
Moving forward, several limitations of the present study point toward potentially valu-
able avenues for future research. First, this study is restricted to one specific variant of
intersecting class and racial markers, and it is of course possible that other overlapping
identities have completely different effects (cf. Philpot and Walton 2007; Coffé and
Theiss-Morse 2016). Insofar as Asian backgrounds may even elicit more positive assess-
ments than white ones (e.g. Visalvanich 2017a), this is a particularly relevant consider-
ation; future studies would thus be especially well-served by the inclusion of a broader
range of candidate backgrounds, including from more denigrated racialized groups
(such as blacks). Second, in highlighting the importance of country-level marker salience
on voter responses (see Konitzer et al. 2019), I necessarily constrain myself to drawing
observations about differences between Canada, the UK, and the US that may not be
reflected elsewhere. Third, and relatedly, I assume that citizen reactions vary across
different ethnic markers (see, for example, Kirkland and Coppock 2018), and this is
likely true even once we extrapolate away from race; “Irish” and “Korean” are not
perfect substitutes for “white” and “non-white,” even setting aside especially stigmatized
minority groups – and this differentiation itself is a source of potential cross-national vari-
ation. Finally, the present study cannot assess how voters might respond to race and class
markers when party labels are attached to candidates, nor can it tell us how voters might
compare sets of candidates with other marginalized identity markers. More realistic,
multi-candidate scenarios would therefore be an especially useful step forward, including
to help minimize the risk of social desirability bias. Would left-wing voters care, for
example, if a Conservative candidate were a working-class black man? Would they
react differently to him if he were a Liberal Democrat, or if he were campaigning
against an upper-class white Labour candidate? Incorporating other relevant traits (e.g.
gender, sexuality, disability) further complicates this picture. Research seeking to
address these sorts of questions would allow us to deepen our understanding of how citi-
zens react to candidates’ overlapping markers of privilege and disadvantage.
Notes
1. The total number of (at least partially) completed surveys was 1352 in Canada, 1403 in the
UK, and 2236 in the US.
2. Quebec is excluded from the Canadian sample given its distinct political cleavages and
context (see, e.g. Medeiros and Noël 2014).
3. Of these respondents, a substantial proportion identify as non-white (23% in Canada, 7% in
the UK, and 22% in the US) and a non-negligible proportion identify as Asian (8% in Canada,
3% in the UK, and 2% in the US). The female/male gender divide, in turn, is 48/52 in Canada
and 49/51 in the UK and the US, while the respective age breakdowns in Canada, the UK, and
the US are as follows: 8%, 9%, and 11% between 18 and 24; 16%, 20%, and 16% between 25
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and 34; 17%, 22%, and 17% between 35 and 44; 18%, 14%, and 18% between 45 and 54; 23%,
18%, and 17% between 55 and 64; and 19%, 16%, and 20% 65 and over.
4. Wordings of vote and understand are adapted from similar survey experiments (e.g. Carnes
and Lupu 2016; Ostfeld 2018).
5. This variation is due to differences in the available background data from the surveys in
which these experiments were embedded, as I aligned the item on the candidate’s class
with the general item on the respondent’s class identification.
6. The left/center/right breakdown is respectively as follows: 288, 445, and 370 in Canada; 322,
438, and 369 in the UK; and 400, 712, and 628 in the US.
7. Having confirmed that these results are equivalent to those from ordered logistic regressions, I
present theOLSfindings for ease of interpretation andpresentation. Also note that as randomiz-
ation was effective across the treatments, I exclude controls from the models (see Mutz 2011).
8. Figures illustrated using coefplot (Jann 2014) and the 538 scheme (Bischof 2017).
9. See Online Appendix Figure 1 for an overview of mean treatment group responses (with cor-
responding 83.5% confidence intervals). Note that a lack of overlap between the 83.5% confi-
dence intervals allows us to roughly visualize statistically significant differences at the p < 0.05
level (see Bolsen and Thornton 2014).
10. See Online Appendix Figure 2 for corresponding mean responses by treatment group.
11. Cohen’s d statistics are: 0.33 for the lower class white treatment; 0.44 for the higher class
background Asian one; and 0.50 for the lower class Asian one.
12. Cohen’s d = 0.38.
13. Cohen’s d ranges from 0.26 (US, lower-class Asian treatment) to 0.36 (UK, lower-class Asian
treatment).
14. See Online Appendix Figure 3 for corresponding mean responses by treatment group.
15. Cohen’s d = 0.32.
16. See Online Appendix Figure 4 for corresponding mean responses by treatment group.
17. Cohen’s d = 0.19.
18. Cohen’s d = 0.25.
19. Cohen’s d ranges from 0.23 in the US with the lower-class Asian treatment to 0.39 in Canada
with the lower-class white one.
20. I carry out this analysis using ordered logistic regressions in each case, save for with the
binary “working class” question in the US (where I employ a standard logistic regression).
Note that I examine responses to the two US questions separately.
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Appendix
Table A1. OLS regression results, interacting treatment conditions and country.
Vote Understand Similar More
Lower class background 0.0376*
(0.016)
0.0884***
(0.017)
0.0695***
(0.017)
0.0336*
(0.017)
Asian 0.00493
(0.016)
0.0116
(0.017)
0.00448
(0.017)
−0.00134
(0.017)
Lower class background # Asian −0.00460
(0.023)
0.00231
(0.024)
−0.00974
(0.024)
0.0330
(0.024)
Country baseline: US
Canada −0.0556**
(0.019)
−0.0504*
(0.020)
−0.0259
(0.020)
−0.0519**
(0.020)
UK −0.0861***
(0.019)
−0.0359+
(0.019)
−0.0490*
(0.019)
−0.0390*
(0.019)
Lower class background # Canada −0.0131
(0.027)
0.0324
(0.027)
−0.0506+
(0.028)
0.00852
(0.027)
Lower class background # UK 0.00463
(0.027)
0.00324
(0.028)
−0.0334
(0.028)
−0.0175
(0.027)
Asian # Canada 0.0151
(0.027)
0.0203
(0.028)
0.00414
(0.028)
0.0323
(0.027)
Asian # UK 0.00345
(0.026)
−0.00856
(0.027)
0.00697
(0.027)
−0.0110
(0.026)
(Continued )
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Table A1. Continued.
Vote Understand Similar More
Lower class background # Asian # Canada 0.0192
(0.037)
−0.0169
(0.038)
0.0294
(0.039)
−0.0343
(0.038)
Lower class background # Asian # UK −0.0346
(0.037)
−0.0207
(0.038)
−0.0204
(0.038)
−0.0119
(0.038)
Constant 0.634***
(0.012)
0.605***
(0.012)
0.569***
(0.012)
0.639***
(0.012)
Observations 3966 3966 3966 3966
R2 0.030 0.041 0.022 0.019
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.039 0.019 0.016
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
+p < 0.10.
*p < 0.05.
**p < 0.01.
***p < 0.001.
Table A2. OLS regression results, interacting treatment conditions, country, and ideology.
Vote Understand Similar More
Lower class background 0.0377
(0.025)
0.101***
(0.026)
0.116***
(0.026)
0.0515*
(0.026)
Asian −0.00643
(0.025)
−0.00172
(0.026)
0.0557*
(0.026)
0.00873
(0.026)
Lower class background # Asian 0.0391
(0.036)
0.00920
(0.037)
−0.0592
(0.037)
0.0230
(0.037)
Country Baseline: US
Canada −0.0103
(0.030)
−0.0335
(0.031)
0.0378
(0.031)
−0.0228
(0.031)
UK −0.0671*
(0.029)
0.00569
(0.030)
0.0233
(0.030)
−0.0130
(0.030)
Lower class background # Canada −0.0433
(0.042)
−0.00284
(0.043)
−0.125**
(0.043)
0.0102
(0.043)
Lower class background # UK 0.00220
(0.043)
−0.0353
(0.044)
−0.0937*
(0.044)
−0.0492
(0.043)
Asian # Canada −0.0132
(0.041)
−0.00197
(0.042)
−0.0762+
(0.042)
0.00327
(0.042)
Asian # UK −0.0116
(0.041)
−0.0405
(0.042)
−0.0937*
(0.042)
−0.0396
(0.041)
Lower class background # Asian # Canada 0.0152
(0.058)
0.0283
(0.060)
0.101+
(0.060)
−0.0368
(0.059)
Lower Class Background # Asian # UK −0.0399
(0.059)
−0.0254
(0.060)
0.0381
(0.060)
0.0135
(0.060)
Ideology baseline: center
Left −0.0570+
(0.030)
−0.0606+
(0.031)
−0.0667*
(0.031)
−0.0359
(0.031)
Right −0.00435
(0.026)
0.0228
(0.027)
0.0401
(0.027)
0.0105
(0.026)
Lower class background # Left 0.00884
(0.043)
0.0407
(0.045)
−0.0236
(0.045)
0.00187
(0.044)
Lower class background # right −0.00671
(0.037)
−0.0574
(0.038)
−0.114**
(0.038)
−0.0495
(0.037)
Asian # left 0.0547
(0.042)
0.0412
(0.044)
−0.0511
(0.043)
−0.00252
(0.043)
Asian # right −0.00170
(0.037)
0.0143
(0.038)
−0.106**
(0.038)
−0.0246
(0.038)
Lower class background # Asian # left −0.0876
(0.060)
−0.0302
(0.062)
0.0334
(0.062)
−0.00243
(0.061)
Lower class background # Asian # right −0.0601
(0.053)
−0.00452
(0.054)
0.122*
(0.054)
0.0295
(0.054)
Canada # Left −0.0929+
(0.049)
−0.0442
(0.051)
−0.0888+
(0.051)
−0.0679
(0.050)
(Continued )
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Table A2. Continued.
Vote Understand Similar More
Canada # right −0.0572
(0.044)
−0.00783
(0.046)
−0.111*
(0.046)
−0.0298
(0.045)
UK # left −0.0458
(0.048)
−0.0515
(0.049)
−0.120*
(0.049)
−0.0829+
(0.049)
UK # Right −0.0155
(0.043)
−0.0747+
(0.044)
−0.111*
(0.044)
−0.00977
(0.043)
Lower class background # Canada # Left 0.0747
(0.069)
0.0540
(0.071)
0.0669
(0.071)
0.00253
(0.070)
Lower class background # Canada # Right 0.0366
(0.061)
0.0526
(0.063)
0.165**
(0.063)
−0.00303
(0.062)
Lower class background # UK # Left 0.0450
(0.069)
0.0492
(0.071)
0.0836
(0.071)
0.0570
(0.070)
Lower class background # UK # Right −0.0225
(0.062)
0.0688
(0.064)
0.116+
(0.063)
0.0491
(0.063)
Asian # Canada # Left 0.0704
(0.067)
0.0941
(0.069)
0.120+
(0.069)
0.0877
(0.069)
Asian # Canada # Right 0.0146
(0.063)
−0.00835
(0.065)
0.135*
(0.064)
0.00922
(0.064)
Asian # UK # Left −0.00248
(0.065)
−0.0000960
(0.067)
0.143*
(0.067)
0.0725
(0.066)
Asian # UK # Right 0.0523
(0.060)
0.107+
(0.062)
0.201**
(0.062)
0.0371
(0.061)
Lower class background # Asian # Canada # Left −0.0212
(0.095)
−0.103
(0.098)
−0.0774
(0.097)
−0.00991
(0.096)
Lower Class Background # Asian # Canada # Right 0.0337
(0.086)
−0.0478
(0.089)
−0.153+
(0.089)
0.0178
(0.088)
Lower class background # Asian # UK # Left 0.0167
(0.093)
0.0752
(0.096)
−0.0522
(0.096)
0.0129
(0.095)
Lower class background # Asian # UK # Right −0.0164
(0.086)
−0.0636
(0.089)
−0.157+
(0.089)
−0.104
(0.088)
Constant 0.648***
(0.018)
0.610***
(0.018)
0.569***
(0.018)
0.643***
(0.018)
Observations 3966 3966 3966 3966
R2 0.045 0.054 0.055 0.032
Adjusted R2 0.037 0.046 0.047 0.023
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
+p < 0.10.
*p < 0.05.
**p < 0.01.
***p < 0.001.
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